Move aside, Tokyo. Seven of the world's ten most expensive markets -- Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Chongqing -- are in China

除了东京，世界上房价最贵的十座城市，中国就占了七个，分别是：北京、上海、深圳、香港、天津、广州和重庆。

Five big Chinese cities rank among the priciest housing markets in the world, surpassing notoriously expensive cities like Tokyo, London and New York, based on calculations by the International Monetary Fund. In fact, seven out of 10 of the world's least affordable markets--Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Chongqing--are now in China. Here's a look at how China's biggest cities stack up, via Sober Look:

在中国，有五座城市的房价超过了世界上最贵的一些城市，比如东京、伦敦和纽约。根据国际货币基金组织，实际上，世界房价最贵的十座城市中，中国占了七个，分别是：北京、上海、深圳、香港、天津、广州和重庆。

Note that that the price-to-wage ratio, which measures median housing prices in a given city against median disposable incomes, reflects affordability rather than absolute property value. This means the mid-range price of an apartment in New York is 6.2 times more than what a typical family makes in a year. By comparison, it would take nearly a quarter-century of earnings to buy a pad in Beijing's capital outright.

工资价格比率是衡量某个城市住房可支配收入的中位数，也可以衡量支付能力，不是值。这意味着说，在纽约的一所公寓平均价格差不多是普通家庭一年收入的6.2倍。而在北京购买房子差不多需要25年的收入。

Residential property is a big mess for the Chinese government--and it's not going away. Last month, prices on new homes leapt 7.4% in June 2012--the biggest uptick since last December.

居民住宅是中国的一个烂摊子，并且不会立刻消失。上个月，房价上涨了7.4%，这是过去十二个月以来上扬。

In short, policies to curb housing inflation aren't working. That's worrying news for the government; housing prices are a major source of public resentment. The danger isn't just the threat of popular unrest, though: It's that soaring property prices make people feel less wealthy and less inclined to consume. And that's exactly what the government needs them to do in order to wean the economy off its dependency on exports and credit-driven investment.

总之，遏制房价的政策不起作用，这也是政府的担忧。住房价格也是普通民众不满的一个主要来源，房价飙升让人感觉不够富不愿意消费，这也是政府需要摆脱对出口和信贷驱动投资的依赖。

That brings us to the central government's dilemma: Property investment fuels a big chunk of China's GDP. Here's a look at that, also via Sober Look:

这也给政府带来了困境：中国国内生产总值很大一部分来自房地产投资的驱动。

Sure, the announcement over the weekend that the government will stop evaluating party officials solely on the basis of their contribution to growing GDP--China's probably the only country in the world to announce GDP targets as a matter of policy--is truly momentous. If they're off the hook for hitting targets, it means that local government cadres have less of an incentive to shunt investment to shady property deals to prop up their numbers. It also could make them less reliant on land parcel sales--the prices of which have been rising--to fund their budgets. Part of China's sky-high housing prices comes from this dependency, as we've highlighted in the past. That's both driven up prices and encouraged over-investment in the sector via shadow lending. But the government still needs something to drive its economy while it waits for its households to start consuming.

本周，政府宣布停止只用国内生产总值增长来评价贡献，中国是世界上一个公布GDP作为政策目标的国家，这个意义重大。如果不以此为目标，也就意味着说地方政府不鼓励依靠房地产投资数量来支撑，也可以减少对于土地的依赖。房价一直在上涨，高房价一部分来自于这样的依赖，我们在过去强调，这是驱动价格上涨和过度投资的原因，甚至是影子贷款部门。政府需要推动经济发展的同时，需要更多家庭开始消费。

Finally, a tanking housing market would probably leave dozens of developers--and their local government confederates--underwater. That could be cataclysmic for Chinese banks that have lent willy-nilly to to developers.

，房地产市场可能会留下几十家开发商，银行不管三七二十一给开发商贷款，这可能是灾难性的。

In other words, a drop-off in property investment could cause a big drop in GDP growth, just as cooling the market risks causing a spike in bad debt. Will these costs be more than the central government is willing to risk?

换句话说，房地产投资放缓会导致GDP增长大幅下降，市场降温可能导致坏账激增。中国政府愿意承担这些风险吗？